































































changeless	deification”.70		We	now	have	the	resources	to	reply	to	one	of	the	arguments	in	favour	of	the	dynamic	view	of	heaven.71	This	argument	can	be	summarised	like	this:		 (1) The	life	of	the	blessed	in	heaven	should	be	similar	in	form	to	life	on	earth.	(2) Life	on	earth	is	characterised	by	activity,	work,	and	development.	(3) Therefore,	the	life	of	the	blessed	in	heaven	should	be	characterised	by	activity,	work,	and	development.		But	for	writers	such	as	Theophan	and	Gregory,	premise	(1)	is	false.	Although	they	agree	that	the	spiritual	life	is	characterised	by	hard	work,	they	hold	that	this	hard	work	has	a	purpose	beyond	itself.	If	the	religious	devotee	finds	that	her	spiritual	labour	yields	results,	and	she	grows	in	understanding	and	devotion	to	God,	this	is	not	because	the	labour	itself	constitutes	spiritual	growth	or	devotion.	Rather,	it	is	only	a	means	to	an	end,	and	ultimately	the	labour	will	cease,	having	achieved	its	end.		The	sixth-century	hermit	Barsanuphias	of	Gaza	illustrated	this	when	he	wrote:	“When	you	arrive	at	the	point	of	stillness,	then	you	shall	find	rest	with	grace”.72	This	connection	between	stillness	and	rest	is	significant,	because	it	fits	with	the	common	conception	of	heaven	as	eternal	rest.	Jürgen	Moltmann	articulates	a	similar	idea	when	he	states	that	he	believes	“that	God’s	history	with	our	lives	will	go	on	after	our	deaths,	until	that	completion	has	been	reached	in	which	a	soul	finds	rest”.73	And	this	aspiration	to	rest	is	found	throughout	popular	piety	and																																																									68	See	e.g.	Gregory	of	Sinai,	On	Commandments	and	Doctrines	etc.	14,	in	Palmer,	Sherrard,	and	Ware	(1995:	272-73),	my	italics	69	Further	Texts	5,	in	Palmer,	Sherrard,	and	Ware	(1995:	254)	70	On	Commandments	and	Doctrines	etc.	8,	in	Palmer,	Sherrard,	and	Ware	(1995:	213)	(my	italics)	71	Arguments	of	this	form	can	be	found	–	implicitly	or	explicitly	–	in	Silverman	(2017:	27)	and	Swinburne	(2017:	355-56).	72	Letter	789,	quoted	in	Chryssavgis	(2012:	267)	73	Moltmann	(2001:	66)	
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liturgy.	We	do	not	usually	hope	that	the	dead	find	eternal	activity;	we	do	not	inscribe	agat	in	pace	on	gravestones.	Consider	the	prayer	of	John	Henry	Newman:		 Support	us,	O	Lord,	All	the	day	long	of	this	life,	Until	the	shadows	lengthen	and	the	evening	comes,	The	busy	world	is	hushed	And	the	fever	of	life	is	done.	Then,	Lord,	in	your	mercy,	grant	us	a	safe	lodging,	A	holy	rest,	and	peace	at	the	last.74		Josef	Staudinger,	similarly,	writes:			 Heaven	is	the	great	haven	of	rest	when	this	life	is	over.	The	river	of	time	that	ran	its	chequered	course	amid	anguish	and	suffering,	care	and	worry,	has	now	flowed	into	the	region	of	eternal	calm.	A	deep	peace,	gentle,	inexpressibly	sweet,	possesses	the	soul,	a	peace	such	as	the	world	cannot	give	and	which	the	soul	can	enjoy	only	by	being	absorbed	by	the	ocean	of	peace	which	is	God	himself,	to	be	folded	for	ever	in	its	embrace…	It	is	the	great	sabbatical	rest	of	God	into	which	the	soul	has	entered;	for	“he	that	is	entered	into	his	rest,	the	same	hath	rested	from	his	works,	as	God	did	from	his”	(Hebr.	4,	10).75		Some	have	tried	to	reconcile	this	language	with	a	dynamic	view	of	heaven.	For	example,	Henry	Eyster	Jacobs	tells	us	that	the	language	of	rest	refers	only	to	“the	toil	and	trouble	of	this	life”,	and	does	not	mean	an	end	to	progress	and	change.76	But	as	we	have	seen,	there	is	no	need	for	such	an	assumption,	because	the	happiness	of	the	blessed	can	be	secured	without	it.		
Three	objections		But	is	happiness	sufficient?	There	are	three	elements	to	the	heavenly	life	which,	it	might	be	argued,	the	view	developed	here	cannot	accommodate.	These	are	its	bodily	nature,	its	communal	aspect,	and	the	need	for	virtue.		One	objection	to	conceptions	of	heaven	based	on	the	beatific	vision	is	that	they	offer	no	role	for	the	body,	which	seems	not	to	be	required	simply	to	contemplate	the	divine	beauty	for	eternity.	But	Christian	orthodoxy	has	always	held	that	the	blessed	will	enjoy	a	bodily	existence.77	Thus	we	find	Aquinas	arguing	that	the	souls	of	the	departed	can	enjoy	the	beatific	vision	fully	before	being	reunited	with	their	bodies,	while	also	insisting,	rather	feebly,	that	union	with	the	body	is	still	necessary	for	perfect	happiness	because	this	is	the	natural	state	of	the	soul.78	The	problem	might	be	thought	worse	for	a	conception	of	heaven	that	involves	no	activity	on	the	part	of	the	blessed	–	if	they	do	nothing,	they	have	even	less	need	for	a	body.79																																																											74	from	“Wisdom	and	Innocence”,	Sermons	on	Subjects	of	the	Day	75	Staudinger	(1964:	128,	130)	76	Quoted	in	Silverman	(2017:	18)	77	See	e.g.	Morreall	(1980:	33-34)	78	ST	I-ii,	q.	4	aa.	5-6.	See	Trabbic	(2011:	558-63)	79	I	am	grateful	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	TheoLogica	for	raising	this	objection.	
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I	do	not	think	this	is	a	very	strong	objection,	because	it	could	equally	well	apply	to	dynamic	conceptions	of	heaven.	If	it	is	possible	to	contemplate	God	without	a	body,	it	is	presumably	just	as	possible	to	grow	in	knowledge	and	wisdom	about	God	without	a	body	too.	There	is	nothing	inconsistent	about	supposing	that	the	blessed	can	persist	in	a	state	of	serene	inactivity	with	a	body,	even	if	it	is	true	that	such	a	state	does	not	require	a	body,	and	so	there	is	nothing	here	at	odds	with	Christian	orthodoxy.	More	strongly,	we	might	say	that	the	objection	assumes	that	disembodied	existence	is	possible	at	all,	which	is	controversial.	Perhaps	it	is	not	possible,	in	which	case	the	blessed	will	require	bodies	if	they	are	to	exist	in	any	state,	whether	active	or	not.80		The	second	objection	is	that	heaven	is	supposed	to	be	communal.	Consider,	for	example,	the	depiction	of	the	heavenly	Jerusalem	in	Revelation	21-22.	But	an	eternity	spent	doing	nothing	does	not	require	the	participation	of	others,	removing	any	role	for	community	in	the	heavenly	life.81		I	do	not	think	it	is	correct	to	think	that	a	purely	passive	experience	is	unaltered	by	sharing	it	with	others.	Most	people	prefer	to	go	to	the	cinema	or	the	theatre	in	company,	even	though	they	may	not	do	anything	during	the	performance,	even	speak	to	their	companions	–	at	least	if	they	have	good	manners.	The	mere	fact	that	the	experience	is	shared	with	others	enhances	it.	Perhaps	this	could	apply	to	heaven	as	well.	If	so,	we	might	modify	the	stability	desires	of	the	blessed:	perhaps	they	desire	not	merely	to	be	in	the	presence	of	God,	but	to	be	in	the	presence	of	God	together	with	others.	It	would,	after	all,	be	reasonable	for	the	blessed	to	want	other	people	to	enjoy	perfect	happiness	as	well.	Such	a	stability	desire	would	require	the	communal	aspect	to	remain	fulfilled.		The	most	serious	objection	to	this	view	of	heaven,	though,	is	that	we	would	normally	want	to	say	that	the	blessed	are	virtuous.	Following	both	Augustine	and	Aquinas,	Timothy	Pawl	and	Kevin	Timpe	broadly	define	virtues	as	“dispositions	of	individuals	by	means	of	which	they	act	well”.82	If	the	blessed	never	act,	then	they	cannot	have	such	dispositions	and	cannot	be	thought	virtuous.		One	might	respond	by	pointing	out	that	a	virtuous	person	is	still	virtuous	even	when	asleep.	A	person	does	not	have	to	be	exercising	a	virtue,	or	even	doing	anything	at	all,	to	be	considered	virtuous,	because	the	disposition	to	act	virtuously	persists.	But	a	person	who	is	asleep	retains	that	disposition	because	she	might	wake	up	and	exercise	it.	We	would	be	less	inclined	to	call	a	person	in	an	irreversible	coma	virtuous,	because	she	has	lost	that	disposition.	Similarly,	if	the	blessed	are	permanently	resting,	they	will	never	be	disposed	to	act	virtuously.																																																									80	Morreall	(1980:	34)	considers	and	rejects	this	response,	on	the	grounds	that	Christian	eschatology	requires	it	to	be	possible	for	a	person’s	soul,	as	her	identity-bearer,	to	exist	without	the	body.	Certainly	Christian	tradition	supposes	this	but	I	do	not	think	it	as	essential	to	Christian	
orthodoxy	as	Morreall	claims.	81	I	am	grateful	to	Andrew	Roberts,	as	well	as	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	TheoLogica,	for	raising	this	objection.	82	Pawl	and	Timpe	(2017:	98)	
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	Nevertheless,	we	can	think	of	dispositions	modally.	Even	a	person	who	is	unable	to	act	can	meaningfully	be	said	to	have	certain	dispositions	to	act	in	the	sense	that	she	would	act	in	such	a	way	if	she	were	able.	If	a	virtuous	person	and	a	vicious	person	are	both	lying	in	irreversible	comas,	they	may	be	equally	incapable	of	practising	virtue	and	vice	–	but	we	nevertheless	would	recognise	that,	if	they	were	able	to	act,	they	would	not	act	similarly.		By	way	of	illustration,	consider	whether	God	should	be	called	virtuous.	Aquinas	comments	that	virtues	associated	with	the	will,	such	as	justice,	can	be	ascribed	to	God,	but	others	–	such	as	political	virtues,	and	temperance,	fortitude,	and	meekness	–	cannot.83	And	surely	it	would	be	odd	to	suppose	that	God	is	virtuous	in	the	same	way	as	human	beings.	But	according	to	the	doctrine	of	incarnation,	God	the	Son	became	a	human	being,	and	exhibited	every	virtue	perfectly,	even	those	that	cannot	normally	be	ascribed	to	God.	It	would	seem,	then,	that	although	God	cannot	be	called	virtuous	in	the	same	way	that	human	beings	can,	God	can	be	said	to	have	a	disposition	such	that,	were	God	to	become	a	human	being,	God	would	act	in	a	virtuous	way.	Neither	the	Father	nor	the	Holy	Spirit	has	become	incarnate,	and	so	neither	of	them	has	exhibited	(say)	the	virtue	of	temperance	–	but	we	can	be	confident	that	if	they	were	to	become	incarnate,	they	would	exhibit	that	virtue.		Similarly,	we	could	say	that	the	blessed	do	not	act	in	a	virtuous	way	–	but	this	is	not	because	they	lack	virtue.	Rather,	they	have	gone	beyond	the	kind	of	existence	in	which	virtues	are	exhibited	at	all.	Were	they	to	re-enter	an	earthly	human	existence	–	if	such	a	thing	were	possible	–	they	would	exhibit	the	human	virtues,	just	as	the	divine	Son	did.			This,	again,	finds	support	in	the	hesychast	tradition.	Gregory	of	Sinai	writes:		 The	principle	and	source	of	the	virtues	is	a	good	disposition	of	the	will,	that	is	to	say,	an	aspiration	for	goodness	and	beauty.	God	is	the	source	and	ground	of	all	supernal	goodness.	Thus	the	principle	of	goodness	and	beauty	is	faith…	it	is	this	for	which	the	monk	seeks	when	he		plunges	into	the	depths	of	stillness	and	it	is	this	for	which	he	sells	all	his	own	desires	through	obedience	to	the		commandments,	so	that	he	may	acquire	it	even	in	this	life.84		On	this	view,	then,	what	we	call	virtue	ultimately	derives	from	having	a	will	perfectly	attuned	to	God.		It	is	because	the	virtuous	person	has	such	a	will	that	she	has	a	disposition	to	act	in	a	certain	way.	Because	the	blessed	desire	only	God,	their	wills	are	perfectly	attuned	in	such	a	way.	So	even	though	they	do	not	act	in	a	virtuous	way,	because	they	do	not	act,	their	wills	are	such	that,	were	they	to	be	in	a	situation	where	action	were	appropriate,	they	would	act	in	a	way	we	would	call	virtuous.			
The	exhaustion	problem																																																										83	ST	I	q	21	a	1	84	Gregory	of	Sinai,	On	Stillness	and	Prayer	83	in	Palmer,	Sherrard,	and	Ware	(1995:	228)		
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For	many,	the	conception	of	heaven	that	I	have	articulated	here	is	an	intrinsically	repellent	one.	The	notion	of	an	eternity	of	inactivity	is,	for	some,	more	like	hell	than	heaven.	But	I	suspect	that	much	of	the	scholarly	fear	of	inactivity	–	and	of	boredom	itself	–	derives	more	from	the	personality	of	the	scholars	who	have	written	about	it	than	it	does	from	human	nature	in	general.	Many	academics	–	particularly	the	successful	ones	–	are	almost	driven	people,	constitutionally	incapable	of	putting	work	aside	even	on	holiday.85	Tellingly,	Lars	Svendsen	states	that	he	found	himself	writing	a	book	on	boredom	specifically	because	he	was	unable	to	do	nothing	at	all:		 After	having	completed	a	lengthy	research	project,	I	was	going	to	relax	and	do…	nothing.	But	that	turned	out	to	be	absolutely	impossible	to	carry	out.	Obviously,	I	was	unable	to	do	nothing.86		But	is	this	typical	of	human	beings	in	general?	Svendsen	himself	goes	on	to	express	a	kind	of	horrified	amazement	at	the	majority	of	people	who	work	all	day,	spend	four	hours	watching	TV	in	the	evening,	and	then	go	to	sleep.	Only	boredom,	he	thinks,	could	motivate	such	depressingly	passive	leisure	activity.	There	is	something	elitist,	even	classist,	about	such	denigration	of	the	leisure	habits	of	ordinary	people.	It	is	reminiscent	of	Aristotle’s	exhausting-sounding	dictum	that	the	purpose	of	relaxation	is	to	restore	our	energy	in	order	to	work,	as	opposed	to	the	notion	that	we	work	in	order	to	be	able	to	afford	to	relax.87	I	would	say	that	this	tells	us	more	about	Aristotle’s	personality	than	it	does	about	human	nature.	To	return	to	Svendsen’s	example,	could	it	not	be	the	case	that	so	many	people	devote	so	much	of	their	leisure	time	to	passive	forms	of	entertainment	not	just	for	convenience’	sake	but	because	they	enjoy	them?	Is	it	really	plausible	to	suppose	that	they	would	all	be	happier	if	they	spent	their	time	studying	philosophy,	or	learning	new	languages,	or	practising	musical	instruments	–	or	the	other	worthy	activities	that	philosophers	recommend?		To	my	mind,	at	least,	the	various	dynamic	conceptions	of	eternity	sound	unattractively	tiring.	Perhaps	that	says	more	than	I	might	wish	about	my	personality.	But	it	is	telling	that	so	much	has	been	written	about	the	problem	of	boredom	in	heaven,	and	the	need	to	ensure	that	the	blessed	will	be	eternally	active	and	progressing,	and	nothing	at	all	seems	to	have	been	written	about	the	opposing	problem,	that	of	exhaustion.	But	we	could	easily	construct	an	Exhaustion	Problem	to	parallel	Williams’	Boredom	Problem:		
																																																								85	I	have,	for	example,	personally	known	one	prominent	professor	to	catch	an	overnight	flight	home	at	the	end	of	an	exhausting	overseas	round	of	conferences	and	meetings,	land	early	in	the	morning,	and	then	travel	directly	from	the	airport	to	his	office,	declaring	himself	ready	for	“another	day	of	work”.	86	Svendsen	(2005:	7-8)	87	Nicomachean	Ethics	1176b28-1177a1.	Just	a	couple	of	pages	later	(1177b4-6),	Aristotle	seems	to	contradict	this	when	he	states	that	we	work	in	order	to	have	leisure.	But	for	Aristotle,	“leisure”	(σχολή)	is	not	to	be	used	for	idle	amusement,	but	for	improving	study	and	contemplation,	as	he	explains	in	Politics	1333a30-b5;	1334a11-40;	1337b29-1338a30.	Amusement	(παιδιά),	by	contrast,	is	a	sort	of	medicine	of	the	mind,	to	be	used	sparingly	to	restore	our	energies.	On	Aristotle	and	leisure,	see	Owens	(1981);	on	amusement,	see	Kraut	(1989:	164-66).	
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(1)	A	state	of	exhaustion,	continued	indefinitely,	would	eventually	become	intolerable.	(2)	There	are	only	a	finite	number	of	kinds	of	activities	a	person	can	engage	in.	(3)	To	be	meaningful,	immortality	must	involve	stability	of	character.	(4)	Given	enough	time,	any	set	of	activities	will	become	exhausting	to	a	person	who	has	stability	of	character.	(5)	Therefore,	any	meaningful	immortal	existence	would	eventually	become	intolerable.				One	might	seek	to	undermine	such	an	argument	by	denying	its	premise	(4):	the	blessed	need	not	suffer	exhaustion	at	all.	They	will,	in	the	words	of	the	prophet,	soar	on	wings	like	eagles,	and	run	and	not	grow	weary.88	Such	a	reply	envisages	that	our	natural	tendency	to	become	tired	in	this	life	is	a	contingent	fact	about	our	current	state,	something	that	God	can	remove	to	allow	us	to	enjoy	eternal	activity	in	the	next	life.	But	if	it	is	easy	to	suppose	that	God	can	change	people	so	that	they	do	not	become	exhausted	by	endless	activity,	it	is	surely	just	as	easy	to	suppose	that	God	can	change	people	so	that	they	do	not	become	bored	by	endless	inactivity.	The	fact	that	the	latter	seems	to	be	a	stumbling	block	for	many	writers	who	accept	the	former	without	complaint	is,	I	think,	due	more	to	personal	taste	than	to	any	significant	difference	between	the	two	cases.		
Conclusion		I	have	argued	that	the	Boredom	Argument	is	a	more	serious	problem	for	traditional	belief	in	heaven	than	is	commonly	realised.	The	dynamic	view	of	heaven,	fashionable	today	as	an	answer	to	this	problem,	does	not	succeed,	at	least	not	as	it	has	been	presented	to	date.	A	better	strategy	for	the	believer	in	heaven	is	to	question	the	Boredom	Argument’s	assumption	that	human	beings	tend	to	become	bored	by	default.	A	static	view	of	heaven,	in	which	the	blessed	enjoy	the	serenity	of	only	having	stability	desires,	can	explain	how	they	remain	happy	and	never	become	bored,	even	in	a	state	of	eternal	inactivity.89		
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